My Response To Media Watch Questions Over The BoM Audit on 23 October 2026.
On the 23rd Oct, Media Watch contacted me with questions by phone and email. My response needs to be in by 9.00 a.m Monday 26 October. As I told them:
For the avoidance of
doubt: I intend to publish this exchange — your questions and my answers — in
full on my blog, after your deadline has passed and after the segment has
aired. I am telling you this now so there are no surprises, and so the record
of what I was asked and what I said is available to anyone who wishes to check
it. I have no objection to you quoting from my answers; I would simply ask that
any quotation be in context, and publishing the full exchange is the simplest
way to ensure that.
Response to your questions of 23 October
1. Qualifications and experience
I am a computer engineer by training.
I worked for ICL Computers (later Fujitsu) in Johannesburg and Sydney for 12
years, which was treated as unbroken service.
My work there was in computer engineering and systems analysis. I also
did 3 years contracting in the field. (Employment history at end of pdf).
Since then I have worked in computer
analytics and statistical modelling. I use commercial statistical software
(Salford Systems, Netica, JMP) for consulting and analysis. My
deception-detection modelling was presented at the Tasmanian Prosecutors Conference
in 2017 (verifiable by Tony Jacobs QC).
You may have read from my blog that
that I and beat the University of Michigan lie detection benchmark with my
model. It is mentioned in the FBI exchange too. I have also done computer
analysis of election linguistics for a political leader. The corporate
entertainment work is a separate career path; it is not the basis of the audit.
The audit is a data integrity
analysis — deduplication, precision-loss detection, and pattern analysis on a
published dataset. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_deduplication.
Those are standard computing
techniques. They do not require climate science qualifications, and the claim
that they do is a category and labelling error.
It is documented in any computer
science textbook, used in every backup system in the world. It requires
comparing data blocks for identity. It does not require a climate science
degree, any more than auditing a bank's ledgers requires a degree in economics.
The BOM's own data is published in
CSV files. I have attached some for you. The duplication is visible in those
files. The question is not whether I am qualified to see it — the question is
why the BOM's quality control did not.
The findings are checkable by anyone
with the files, and I am happy to walk you through the method.
I would add one factual note. My site
analytics show 3 visits to my
deception-detection site from the ABC which started on the same
day the BOM made a statement.
This blog describes my computer
analysis and statistical modelling — in the days before your email.
ABC also downloaded my Audit file at
that time. I mention this because the email states that the only publicly
available information relates to entertainment.
The technical material is publicly
available and was accessed by the ABC.
2. The FBI
I was not employed or contracted by
the FBI. In September 2020, Frank J. Marsh, an Instructor at the FBI Academy,
contacted me to ask about my methods and to ask whether I had written a book or
training material. He stated he was "honored and humbled" by
the information I shared and asked to share it with colleagues.
The full exchange is attached. We
exchanged ideas and files several times over the years. I share it not to
overstate the connection but to show that the methods have been of interest to
law enforcement professionals.
3. Response to the BoM statement
Attached is my analysis of the BoM
statement, and a one-page summary of key findings. In brief:
The BOM's statement says it has 'detected
no further duplicate months in the entire bureau network other than those
quoted in the report and then confirmed by us.'
That claim is contradicted by the
BOM's own published data, in four places, all from Sydney (station 066062) and
all flagged Quality = Y.
The clearest is June 1943 and June
1944. All thirty days of June 1943 are replicated exactly in June 1944. This
falls inside the pre-1946 window the BOM itself cites, so the pre-1946
explanation does not dispose of it — it includes it.
Two complete months of daily
observations cannot both be original; one is a copy of the other; and the QC
flag cannot be correct for both.
The second is a seam rather than a
copy. In December 1935 and December 1936, fourteen days are identical, then two
days appear only in 1936, then a value of 20 appears in both columns with the
1935 record carrying no days-of-accumulation flag, then fourteen more days are
identical.
That is the signature of a block
splice — a join point with a two-day insert and a malformed record at the
stitch — not an isolated transcription error.
The third is November 1903 and
November 1905, where all thirty days are replicated. I accept the BOM may treat
this as outside the ACORN-SAT window; I include it for completeness, not as the
basis of the complaint.
The fourth is a seven-day replication
across the January/February 1910 boundary, in the first year of the Bureau's
standardised record.
These are not 'misunderstandings'
of homogenisation. They are countable, checkable, whole-block replications in
the public record, and they falsify the specific sentence in the
BOM's statement that says no further duplicate months exist.
- The BoM characterises the errors as
isolated transcription mistakes. A transcription mistake is a single wrong
value. Thirty consecutive identical numbers, in the same order, two years
apart, is a block copy. It is not what "isolated transcription error"
describes.
- Separately, the Lost Decimals
Report documents 51,249 station-days of precision loss across 23 ACORN-SAT
stations between 1995 and 2011. This is a modern-era data failure, not a
historical quirk, and the BoM statement does not address it.
- The audit does not allege
deliberate manipulation by individuals. It documents systematic data-handling
failures that are statistically significant and structurally patterned.
4. The "innocent errors"
question
The question offers two options —
small-scale innocent errors, or deliberate manipulation — and neither describes
what the audit found. A single duplicate could in principle be innocent. The
pattern of fifty block events across seventeen stations, with 42% post-1990,
and a Monte Carlo result of p < 0.0001, is not consistent with random
innocent error. Whether the cause was a software fault, a manual copy, or a
digitisation process is a question for the BoM. What it is not is a random
transcription slip.
I am happy to provide the full
analysis, the data, or a walkthrough of the method. I am confident the findings
stand up to scrutiny.
I have attached the relevant csv's
that directly contradict BOM's statement.
Extra questions:
The BoM says the roughly 200 errors
it identified are likely transcription mistakes from punch-card records dating
to the 1960s, and are statistically irrelevant. How do you respond?
You are merging 2 statements into one
causal claim.
The BOM says the duplicates are "all
from handwritten records of pre-1946 data that have been manually
digitised."
Separately, the BOM says records "were
digitised using methods including punch-card systems in the 1960s, which may
have contributed to isolated transcription errors."
You have merged these into one causal
claim: the errors were caused by 1960s punch-card transcription. The BOM
does not say that. It says the errors are from handwritten pre-1946
records, and that punch-cards may have contributed. The BOM is explicitly
hedging ("may have contributed," "is confirming if it was the
cause").
So you have taken a hedged maybe
and turned it into a definite cause. That is a real distortion.
The BOM says "so small as to
be statistically irrelevant." This is the BOM's own phrase.
What your "statistically
irrelevant" paraphrase omits:
The BOM's statement also says "Further investigation has detected no
further duplicate months in the entire bureau network other than those quoted
in the report and then confirmed by us."
You have dropped the completeness
claim entirely. That is the claim my data actually falsifies. By omitting it,
you have removed the one part of the BOM's statement that is checkably wrong. The BOM’s claim is falsified and can be checked with the attached csv’s.
A transcription mistake means: the person reading the paper record wrote down the wrong number, or the
keypunch operator punched the wrong card, or a digit was transposed. It implies
an isolated, random, human error — one value wrong, in one place, at one time.
That is not what the data
shows. Latest Sydney data shows:
1. June 1943 / June 1944. Whole-month replication, inside the BOM's own pre-1946 window, both
flagged Quality = Y. This is the one that falsifies the BOM's "no further
duplicate months" claim without any caveat.
2. December 1935 / December 1936 (strongest evidence of a seam). 14 identical days, a two-day insert, a
malformed shared value, 14 more identical days.
This is the one that shows the
mechanism — a block splice — rather than just a copy.
3. November 1903 / November 1905 (strong but pre-1910). Whole-month replication, but outside the
ACORN-SAT window, so the BOM can set it aside.
4. January 1910 / February 1910. A seven-day replication across the January/February 1910 boundary, in
the first year of the Bureau's standardised record.ay month (Jun 1943 = Jun
1944), and a 7-day block copied from January into February 1910 are not
transcription errors.
A transcription error does not
reproduce thirty consecutive numbers in the same order two years apart.
That is a copy operation — a block of
data duplicated as a block. The distinction matters enormously.
"Given the seriousness of the
claims you are making, I'm seeking to better understand the expertise and
experience on which they are based. Especially, in circumstances where experts
in climate science and the BoM itself, have dismissed your allegations."
You say experts in climate science
and the BoM itself have dismissed my allegations. I'd ask you to note two
things.
First, the BoM is the subject of the audit, not an independent assessor of
it — its dismissal is the expected response of any institution to an audit of
its own records, and it does not tell us whether the audit is correct.
Second, the climate scientists who have commented have, as far as I can tell,
commented on media reports about the audit rather than on the audit itself. If
any of them have examined the block-count data or the precision-loss windows
and found an error in the method, I would genuinely like to see it — that is
exactly the kind of scrutiny the audit should receive.
But 'dismissed' is not the same as
'assessed and found wanting,' and the difference matters.
The audit is a data integrity
analysis. It identifies duplicated blocks, precision loss, and infill patterns
in a published dataset. Those findings are checkable by anyone with the files —
and they do not require a climate science degree to check, any more than
auditing a set of accounts requires an accounting degree.
The question is not whether the BoM
and its defenders are qualified to dismiss the audit. It is whether the data
supports the audit's findings, and it does.
You (Mario) mentioned on the phone
that a climate expert said a 17 day flatline at Palmerville was "possible".
I would be interested to know which
expert said that, and what they were shown, because 'possible' and 'probable'
are different questions and the audit is about the second one. A 17-day exact
flatline at 0.1°C resolution is not impossible in the way that a perpetual
motion machine is impossible — it is statistically extraordinary. The Monte
Carlo work in the audit addresses exactly this: the probability of a 17-day
exact flatline at that resolution is on the order of 10⁻³⁴, and the frequency of flatlines
across the network is far above what natural variation produces.
If an expert has examined the
surrounding data and the rest of the network and concluded that the observed
frequency is consistent with natural variation, I would genuinely like to see
that analysis — that is the kind of scrutiny the audit should receive. But 'it
is possible' is not that analysis. It answers a different question.
There is also a second point. The
audit's finding is not that one flatline is impossible. It is that
flatlines of 10, 13, and 17 days appear across the network at a frequency that
is not consistent with natural variation, and that ACORN itself creates
flatlines — 10 days at Charters Towers and 13 days at Palmerville — from
raw data that was not flat. A single 'possible' instance does not address that
pattern.
Your report alleges "large-scale
copy-paste operations", "10 years of one-way adjustments" and
"human fingerprint" patterns.
"On 'large-scale copy-paste
operations': the audit identified over 1,000 duplicated blocks, with block
sizes down to five days. That is large scale, and it is the tip of the iceberg
— the audit did not analyse the whole network.
The BOM's statement that it has found
'no further duplicate months' is therefore not a finding of absence; it
is a statement that the search was not done at the block level.
On '10 years of one-way
adjustments': that figure is wrong, and it is wrong in a way that
understates the finding. It is 110 years.
The audit sets out the annual
adjustment series; the ABC has the document and can check it. A 110-year
sequence of same-direction adjustments is not what physical site changes
produce — site moves and screen replacements produce random, bi-directional adjustments.
A 110-year one-way series is the
signature of curve-fitting, and that is why the Random Forest result matters:
70% of the adjustment variance is predicted by calendar decade alone, with no
weather data input.
On 'human fingerprint' patterns: the
audit documents 3+1+3, 4+1+1 and 5+1+5 structures at a scale that natural
variation does not produce, over 800 value traps, and hundreds of three-day
linear-regression blocks between maximum and minimum temperatures.
These are structural signatures —
they are the shape that editing, infilling and carry-forward operations leave
in a dataset. Whether any individual case is natural or not is a question the
BOM can answer for each one; the point is that the frequency and regularity of
the structures across the network is not consistent with natural variation.
That is what 'human fingerprint' was intended to convey, and the data
supports it."
You told me: "I didn't get [my
report] peer reviewed ... because I'm only interested in getting an
audit."
The full sentence should be: "I
didn't get [my report] peer reviewed ... because I'm only interested in getting
an audit, it’s not an Academic Report.” Again, detail matters.
"On approaching the BOM for
comment:
I did not publish the findings. I
sent the report to my federal Member of Parliament, Andrew Wilkie MP. Mr Wilkie
forwarded the report to the Bureau, together with questions for the Bureau to
respond to. The Bureau's reply to Mr Wilkie, signed by Dr Stuart Minchin, is
dated 29 September 2026 and is on the public record. They thanked me twice for my Audit findings. So the Bureau was
approached through the appropriate parliamentary channel, it responded in
writing, and that response is precisely what my analysis of the BOM statement
addresses.
The characterisation that the BOM was
not approached is incorrect.
The parliamentary channel is the
appropriate one for a constituent raising a matter with a government agency,
and it ensures the response is formal and on the record.
You asked me twice about my FBI
contact, it is attached. You asked about my Computer Employment history, it
follows at the end of the pdf.
For the internet:
The pdf of the FBI exchange, my employment history are private and redacted.
The 4 pdf's which falsify the BoM statement are the subject of a blog post coming.
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